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Adecentralized system of competing retailers that order and sell the same product in a sales season is studied.When a customer demand occurs at a stocked-out retailer, that retailer requests a unit to be transshipped
from another retailer who charges a transshipment price. If this request is rejected, the unsatisfied customer may
go to another retailer with a customer overflow probability. Each retailer decides on the initial order quantity
from a manufacturer and on the acceptance/rejection of each transshipment request. For two retailers, we show
that retailers’ optimal transshipment policies are dynamic and characterized by chronologically nonincreasing
inventory holdback levels. We analytically study the sensitivity of holdback levels to explain interesting find-
ings, such as smaller retailers and geographically distant retailers benefit more from transshipments. Numerical
experiments show that retailers substantially benefit from using optimal transshipment policies compared to
no sharing. The expected sales increase in all but a handful of over 3,000 problem instances. Building on the
two-retailer optimal policies, we suggest an effective heuristic transshipment policy for a multiretailer system.
Key words : dynamic transshipment policy; demand overflow; decentralized distribution system
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1. Introduction
A common method of inventory sharing among inde-
pendent retailers is retailer-to-retailer trade, called
transshipment. In transshipment-based inventory shar-
ing, a retailer with sufficient inventory may be will-
ing to sell her inventory to a stocked-out retailer.
This allows a retailer to satisfy demand through other
retailers without frequent shipments from the gener-
ally distant manufacturer.
Transshipment applications are reported in many
retail industries such as automotive, apparel, sporting
goods, toys, furniture, information technology prod-
ucts, and shoes, among production facilities, and in
after-sale services for aircraft and automotive spare
parts (Kukreja et al. 2001, Özdemir et al. 2006, Rudi
et al. 2001, Hu et al. 2008). Time-based competition
and higher demand variability have the potential to
encourage adoption of transshipments (Harris 2006).
In addition, the use of less-than-truckload carriers and
enterprise resource planning software facilitate trans-
shipments. For example, car manufacturers provide
Intranet systems connecting their retailers for infor-
mation exchange (Zhao and Atkins 2009).
Independent retailers may decline to send trans-
shipments because they tend to see each other as com-
petitors. The belief that an unsatisfied customer at
a stocked-out retailer may buy from another retailer
fuels competition among retailers. In a study of
71,000 customers, Corsten and Gruen (2004) found
that customers lose patience with stockouts. Cus-
tomer overflow to another retailer may happen when
a stocked-out retailer, whose transshipment request
is denied, cannot satisfy a customer demand. While
the unwillingness of customers to wait motivates a
stocked-out retailer to request a transshipment, the
possibility of the customer overflow motivates retail-
ers with on-hand inventory to reject the request.
Transshipments provide a retailer with the option
of accessing other retailers’ inventories and markets.
They are real options with which retailers hedge
against risks of both stockouts and leftover inventory.
This paper provides a flexible sharing mechanism that
is regulated by inventory holdback levels. It is an attrac-
tive alternative to pure competition with no inventory
sharing and pure cooperation with complete sharing.
Our study provides easily implementable trans-
shipment and ordering policies for a decentralized
retailer system where transshipments can potentially
be made immediately after each demand arrival and
unsatisfied customers may visit another retailer to sat-
isfy their demands. Allowing a transshipment after
each demand arrival is an important aspect of model-
ing reality as each customer wants to know the avail-
ability of the product, either directly from stock or
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by transshipment, upon his or her visit to the store.
We do not consider in-advance transshipments to
avoid potential future stockouts or delaying a trans-
shipment request, say to potentially increase the profit
from it or its chance of acceptance. In this paper,
as in practice, a transshipment is requested to meet
a demand immediately after the realization of that
demand. This is called an in-season transshipment.
Although transshipments are reported among cen-
tralized and decentralized retailers, studies tend to
focus on centralized ones (e.g., Çömez et al. 2012).
We review studies concerning decentralized systems.
Rudi et al. (2001) study a system of retailers who
use transshipments for demand and inventory match-
ing at the end of a sales season. Extending this, Shao
et al. (2011) analyze the manufacturer’s benefit from
retailers’ transshipments. Anupindi et al. (2001) con-
sider both inventory sharing through transshipment
and physical pooling by using common inventories.
Sošic´ (2006) extends Anupindi et al. (2001) by intro-
ducing a partial pooling policy. In these studies, trans-
shipments occur after all demands are realized at all
retailers.
When a transshipment can happen after each
demand, Grahovac and Chakravarty (2001) use a
one-for-one replenishment policy for both request-
ing and accepting a transshipment. Zhao et al. (2005)
assume an 4S1K5 policy for transshipments and
replenishments. There S is the order-up-to level and
K is the threshold sharing level. They adopt ideas
from rationing policies of multiple demand classes
(Desphande et al. 2003) as customer demand and
transshipment requests are different demand classes.
Zhao et al. (2006) extend both Grahovac and
Chakravarty (2001) and Zhao et al. (2005) by consid-
ering a base-stock replenishment policy, a threshold
level for sending transshipment requests, and another
threshold for filling requests. Considering inventory
sharing and customer overflow, Anupindi and Bassok
(1999) and Zhao and Atkins (2009) compare two
extreme models: no inventory sharing and complete
sharing. In a nontransshipment context, Chen et al.
(2011) obtain a dynamic rationing policy for demand
fulfillment of an e-retailer that carries no inventory
and attempts to meet his demand first from inven-
tory at a primary retailer and then from a secondary
retailer. Inventory is sequentially rationed from these
two retailers that do not share inventory with each
other. We differ from these studies of decentralized
systems by obtaining an optimal transshipment policy
characterized by dynamic holdback levels for inventory-
sharing retailers.
We first study a system of two independent retailers
who maximize their own profits. Each retailer places
a manufacturer order at the beginning of a sales sea-
son. During the season, if a retailer stocks out when a
customer demand occurs, he (requesting retailer) places
a transshipment request to the other (requested) retailer.
If she (requested retailer) accepts the request, the unit
is transshipped after charging a transshipment price
to him. Otherwise, the unsatisfied customer leaves
the requesting retailer and may visit the requested
retailer with a customer overflow probability. There-
fore, a requested retailer may be willing to transship
depending on the transshipment price, the expected
revenue from a possible customer overflow, and the
likelihood of selling the requested unit before the
end of the season. We show that retailers’ optimal
transshipment policies are characterized by dynamic
inventory holdback levels that change during the
season.
Each retailer’s transshipment price is assumed to
be exogenously set to a constant value during the
season. Such prices arise in practice as “[transship-
ment] prices are set by a external agency, such as
a common supplier,” according to Rudi et al. (2001,
p. 1674). When the manufacturer is much larger than
the retailers and has competitive power, it may dic-
tate transshipment prices to retailers. According to
the authors’ private communication with an automo-
bile dealer (Schunck 2009), dealers are dictated to
use a transshipment price that is equal to the cost
of the car to the requested dealer. Our framework
yields the retailer profits under constant transship-
ment prices. So it is useful to set these prices before
the season, possibly with a game-theoretic model that
takes profits as inputs under different prices. Study-
ing the negotiation of dynamic transshipment prices,
Çakanyıldırım et al. (2012) show that certain negotia-
tion power structures lead to constant transshipment
prices.
With more than two retailers, a transshipment
policy should specify where a stocked-out retailer
requests transshipments from when two or more
retailers have inventory. For a given requested retailer,
a holdback policy based only on the inventory level
at that retailer ceases to be optimal. Optimal policies
for multiple retailers are significantly more demand-
ing in information requirements and computations.
To address this, we convert the optimal solution of a
two-retailer system to a heuristic for multiple retail-
ers. The total expected profit is computed with this
heuristic and compared with the total expected cen-
tralized profit, which is a natural profit upper bound
on the decentralized system. This comparison reveals
that the total retailer profits under heuristic transship-
ments differ slightly from the upper bound, so the
heuristic performs well.
Supplementing existing literature, this paper simul-
taneously captures several aspects that arise in
practice in decentralized retailer systems. Each trans-
shipment is requested immediately after the asso-
ciated demand occurs. An unsatisfied demand at
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a retailer can overflow to another retailer. For this
practical setting, the optimal transshipment policy
and its sensitivity to system parameters are obtained
in §2. We numerically study the effect of optimal
transshipments on retailers’ and manufacturers’ prof-
its in §3 and the performance of our multiretailer
heuristic in §4. All proofs and counterexamples can
be found in the e-companion appendix (available at
http://msom.journal.informs.org/).
2. Transshipment Model
A decentralized system of two retailers who receive
inventory from a manufacturer once at the begin-
ning of a sales season is studied. During the sea-
son, if the retailers have available on-hand inventory,
they immediately satisfy their customers’ demands.
If one of the retailers has no inventory to satisfy
his demand, he sends a transshipment request to the
other retailer. The requested retailer, while determin-
ing how to maximize her profit, either accepts or
rejects the request. If the request is accepted, the cost
of transportation  is paid by the requesting retailer.
A unit at retailer i is sold at sale price ri. Expect-
ing a visit from an unsatisfied customer with over-
flow probability i, requested retailer i may reject the
request. With probability 1 − i, the customer leaves
the system of two retailers and neither retailer earns
the revenue.
For a transshipment from retailer i, retailer j pays
transshipment price ti. Then retailer j obtains rj −ti−
by selling the transshipped unit, while retailer i for-
goes at least the salvage value si to earn ti. If rj −
ti −  < 0, receiving a transshipment causes a loss
for retailer j . If ti < si, no transshipment request is
accepted by retailer i. Besides, rj −  ≤ ri should hold
to avoid an arbitrage opportunity to send units to the
high-priced market and sell there. In summary,
si ≤ ti ≤ rj −  ≤ ri for i1 j ∈ 81129 and i 6= j0 (1)
To capture the dynamics of in-season transship-
ments, a model is developed by dividing the sales
season into N short decision periods. Periods are
short enough so that there can be at most one unit
demand in each period, i.e., at retailer 1 with prob-
ability p1, at retailer 2 with probability p2, or at nei-
ther with probability 1 − p1 − p2, where p1 + p2 ≤ 1.
As N increases by a factor and p1 and p2 decrease
by the same factor, the demands converge to inde-
pendent Poisson processes with means Np1 and Np2.
For similar demand models, see Lee and Hersh (1993)
and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004). For correlated
demand models, see Çömez et al. (2010) and Wee and
Dada (2005).
Without loss of generality, the profit is formulated
only for retailer 1, as that for retailer 2 is analogous.
The number of decision periods remaining until the end of
the sales season is denoted by n ≤ N .  in4x11x25 is the
maximum expected profit of retailer i in the remain-
ing n periods with current inventory levels x1 and x2.
When both retailers have positive inventory levels,
each customer demand can be satisfied by the receiv-
ing retailer. Receiving a demand, retailer 1 sells a unit
to earn r1. Otherwise, retailer 1 has no cost or revenue.
1n4x11x25 = 41 − p1 − p251n−14x11x25
+ p1
[
r1 +1n−14x1 − 11x25
]
+ p21n−14x11x2 − 151 (2)
for x11x2 ∈ N 2= 81121 0 0 0 9. When both retailers are
stocked out, demand is lost. With zero inventory in
stock, there is no change in a retailer’s profit from one
period to the next.
1n40105=1n−140105=10 40105= 00 (3)
If retailer 2 stocks out before retailer 1, retailer 1
replies to a transshipment request comparing prof-
its when accepting or rejecting it. By transshipping
a unit to retailer 2, retailer 1 earns t1. Rejecting the
transshipment request may cause the unsatisfied cus-
tomer to visit retailer 1 with probability 1. In this
case, retailer 1 earns r1 from the customer. With prob-
ability 41 −15 the customer leaves the system and no
revenue is obtained. Thus,
1n4x1105
= 41 − p1 − p251n−14x1105+ p1
[
r1 +1n−14x1 − 1105
]
+ p2 max
{
t1 +1n−14x1 − 11051 14r1 +1n−14x1 − 11055
+ 41 − 151n−14x1105
}
0 (4)
If retailer 1 stocks out before retailer 2, retailer 1
asks for transshipments from retailer 2 to meet his
demand. Retailer 1 expects retailer 2 to behave ratio-
nally to maximize her profit while responding to
retailer 1’s transshipment request. Let n1x221 be the
indicator associated with the accept/reject decision of
retailer 2 in response to the transshipment request
of retailer 1 in period n when the inventory level at
retailer 2 is x2.
n1x221 =

1 if t2 +2n−1401x2 −15≥24r2 +2n−1401x2 −155
+41−252n−1401x251
0 otherwise0
If the transshipment request is accepted (n1x221 = 15,
retailer 1 pays the transshipment price t2 and the
transportation cost  to receive the unit, which is then
sold to the customer for r1. Otherwise 
n1x2
21 = 0, and
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retailer 1 loses the customer demand. The resulting
expected profit of retailer 1 is
1n401x25 = 41 − p1 − p251n−1401x25+ p21n−1401x2 − 15
+ p1n1x221
(
r1 − t2 −  +1n−1401x2 − 15
)
+ p141 − n1x221 5
(
2
1
n−1401x2 − 15
+ 41 − 251n−1401x25
)
0 (5)
A retailer asks for a transshipment in (5) when he
stocks out. If the market price, transshipment price,
or transportation cost are dynamic during the season,
the stocked-out retailer may delay a transshipment
request to save competitor’s inventory for future peri-
ods, which is outside the scope of this paper. At the
end of the season, the remaining inventory at retailer
i is sold at si:
 i04x11x25= sixi0 (6)
The objective of each retailer i is to maximize total
expected profit, which is the expected profit  iN minus
the cost of inventory Si purchased at the purchase
cost ci per unit, paid by retailer i to the manufac-
turer at the beginning of the season. Then the profit
of retailer i is
Ji4S11 S25= iN 4S11 S25− ciSi0 (7)
2.1. Optimal Holdback Level-Based Policy
When a transshipment request is received, retailer 1
can determine the trade-off between accepting and
rejecting a request, which is represented by the max-
imum in (4). To better understand this trade-off, we
define 1n4x5 2= 1n4x105− 1n4x − 1105 as the marginal
benefit (of keeping an extra unit of inventory at
retailer 1) when x ∈N and x2 = 0 in period n. From (4)
and (6), extra inventory can only increase profit in the
remaining periods, so 1n4x5 ≥ 0. The marginal bene-
fit function can be written by using (4) for x ≥ 2 and
x = 1 separately, as the expression for x = 1 includes
the profit function 1n40105, which is zero from (3):
1n4x5 = 4p1 +p251n−14x−15+41−p1 −p251n−14x5
+p2
[
max8t111r1 +41−151n−14x59
−max8t111r1 +41−151n−14x−159
]
1
x≥20 (8)
1n415 = p1r1 + 41 − p1 − p251n−1415
+ p2 max
{
t11 1r1 + 41 − 151n−1415
}
0 (9)
At the end of the season, 104x15= s1. The maximum in
(4) can be rewritten as 1n−14x − 1105+ max8t11 1r1 +
41 − 151n−14x59. Then the request of retailer 2 is
accepted if and only if 1r1 + 41 − 151n−14x5 ≤ t1.
Putting parameters on the right-hand side, we get
1n−14x5 ≤ 4t1 − 1r15/41 − 150 (10)
We refer to 4t1 − 1r15/41 − 15 as retailer 1’s marginal
cost of rejecting a request. Toward the characteriza-
tion of the optimal transshipment policy, it suffices to
examine the monotonicity of the marginal benefit in
because the marginal cost is constant.
Lemma 1. For x ∈N and n ∈N∪ 809,
(i) the marginal benefit of keeping an extra unit of
inventory is nonincreasing in inventory level: in4x+ 15≤
in4x5;
(ii) the marginal benefit cannot be more than the unit
selling price: in4x5≤ ri;
(iii) the marginal benefit is nondecreasing in the number
of remaining periods: in4x5≤ in+14x5;
(iv) the marginal benefit cannot be less than the salvage
value: in4x5≥ si.
Recalling the transshipment acceptance condi-
tion (10), Lemma 1(i) leads to the existence of an
optimal transshipment policy based on holdback lev-
els. Lemma 1(iii) implies that retailers have a higher
marginal benefit of rejecting a request earlier in a sales
season. Knowing that the marginal cost function is
constant, retailers should be more willing to accept
transshipment requests when there are fewer periods
remaining in the sales season. Lemma 1 leads to the
optimal transshipment policy stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. There exist inventory holdback levels x˜in
for retailer i such that it is optimal to reject (respec-
tively, accept) the transshipment request when xi ≤ x˜in
(respectively, xi > x˜in). The holdback levels are nondecreas-
ing in the remaining number of periods: x˜i1 ≤ x˜i2 ≤ · · · ≤
x˜in · · · ≤ x˜iN .
The holdback level x˜1n can be obtained as x˜
1
n 2=
max8x ∈ N2 1n−14x5 > 4t1 − 1r15/41 − 159. From
Lemma 1(i), if 1n−1415≤ 4t1 −1r15/41−15, then x˜1n = 0;
i.e., complete sharing is optimal when the expected
benefit of keeping one unit of inventory for retailer 1
is sufficiently low. On the contrary, if 104x5 = s1 >
4t1 −1r15/41−15, then the holdback level of retailer 1
in period 1 is infinite. An infinite holdback level at
a retailer in period n indicates that the retailer is
not willing to send a transshipment regardless of her
inventory level. By Theorem 1, an infinite holdback
level in period 1 indicates infinite holdback levels in
all periods and so a no sharing policy is optimal.
In other words, if the customer overflow probabil-
ity is sufficiently large, i.e., i > 4ti − si5/4ri − si5, then
retailer i never sends any transshipments. To study
both retailers’ transshipment policies, we assume that
i ≤ 4ti − si5/4ri − si5 for i ∈ 81129.
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Theorem 2. If i ≤ 4ti − si5/4ri − si5 for i ∈ 81129,
(i) in period 1, retailer i has a zero holdback level: x˜i1 = 0;
(ii) the holdback level of retailer i cannot decrease by
more than one over a period: x˜in+1 − x˜in ≤ 1.
Theorem 2 states that if retailer i has any inventory
in the last period, she is willing to send a transship-
ment regardless of her inventory level. The highest
decrease in holdback levels between two consecutive
periods is one, which is the maximum demand in a
period. The holdback level-based transshipment pol-
icy is similar to the threshold inventory rationing
policy used to model demand satisfaction in the mul-
tiple customer demand class literature. A transship-
ment accept/reject decision is based on the trade-off
between selling a unit inventory for a low margin cur-
rent transshipment request and keeping it for a high
margin, but possible, future direct customer sale. The
corresponding trade-off in a multiple demand class
problem is between using a unit for a low-class imme-
diate demand and saving the unit for a future high-
class demand. Different from the rationing policies of
the multiple demand class studies, we show the opti-
mality of a dynamic holdback level-based transship-
ment policy for two independent retailers.
2.2. Sensitivity of Holdback Levels
Holdback levels depend on the marginal benefit and
marginal cost of rejecting a transshipment request.
Because the sensitivity of the marginal cost is fairly
straightforward, we focus on the sensitivity of the
marginal benefit at retailer i with respect to (wrt)
parameters p1, p2, ti, ri, si, and i. This sensitivity
is analyzed by appropriately bounding the changes
in the benefit of rejecting a request. The results are
reported in the next theorem. Neither the benefit nor
the cost of rejecting a request depends on the trans-
portation cost  , which is paid by the requesting
retailer, as long as (1) is satisfied. Then the holdback
levels are insensitive to  .
Theorem 3. The holdback levels at retailer i are nonde-
creasing in demand probabilities p1 and p2, sale price ri, sal-
vage value si, and customer overflow probability i. These
levels are nonincreasing in the transshipment price ti.
Strong competition between retailers in the same
geographic district can be modeled by increasing
the customer overflow probability i. An increase in
i leads to higher holdback levels at retailer i by
Theorem 3, which indicates less willingness to trans-
ship among nearby retailers. Zhao and Atkins (2009)
report a similar effect of competition on transship-
ments. In their analysis of complete sharing and no
sharing policies, it is suggested that retailers coop-
erate with holdback level x˜in = 0 when i is low,
and do not cooperate with x˜in =  when i is high.
This principle is implemented, for example, by some
automobile dealers who compete with nearby deal-
ers while cooperating with dealers farther away. Our
model, with the additional flexibility of 0 < x˜in < ,
smoothes the effect of competition on inventory shar-
ing. It suggests that competing retailers use transship-
ments selectively with high, but still finite, holdback
levels.
Theorem 3 also states that an increase in the
expected market size through an increase in either p1
or p2 increases holdback levels at both retailers.
Note that this result is valid for constant N , so
an increase in pi means an increase in retailer i’s
total expected demand. This is consistent with the
wide application of transshipments in industries with
slow-moving products where Npi is low (Grahovac
and Chakravarty 2001). On the other hand, the rela-
tive sensitivity of a retailer’s holdback levels to the
demand probabilities p1 and p2 is an interesting ques-
tion that is not answered by Theorem 3. For a fixed
expected market size N4p1 + p25, demand probabili-
ties affect holdback levels as stated by the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. The holdback levels at retailer i are non-
decreasing in her own expected market size Npi when the
total expected market size is constant.
By Theorem 4, if some retailer j customers migrate
to retailer i’s market, the holdback levels at retailer i
cannot decrease and those at retailer j cannot increase.
In other words, retailer i’s demand is dominant over
retailer j’s demand in determining retailer i’s trans-
shipment policy. For example, when p1 increases and
p2 decreases by the same amount, holdback levels at
retailer 1 either remain the same or increase.
2.3. Inventory Ordering Game
Because retailers have similar delivery lead times
when buying from the same manufacturer, they usu-
ally order at about the same time without knowing
the other’s order quantity, which leads to a Cournot
game. The optimal order quantity of a retailer can be
defined as a best response to the other retailer’s quan-
tity choice:
S∗1 4S25= arg max
S1
J14S11 S25 and
S∗2 4S15= arg max
S2
J24S11 S250
A pure strategy equilibrium 4Se11 S
e
25 satisfies S
e
1 =
S∗1 4S
e
25 and S
e
2 = S∗2 4Se15.
To establish the existence of an equilibrium in
the space of integers, submodularity of profits is a
property that is commonly used (Zhao et al. 2005).
To show the submodularity of Ji in our model, the
profit function  in should be submodular for all n ∈
80111 0 0 0 1N 9. This strong condition does not hold in
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our context as established by a counterexample in the
e-companion appendix.
Although submodularity does not hold in general,
the existence of an equilibrium for ordering noninte-
ger amounts can be shown by extending the definition
of profit functions. Noninteger orders are present in
many inventory studies, including those of inventory
sharing (Anupindi et al. 2001, Dong and Rudi 2004).
Using interpolation (Phillips 2003), the profit function
Ji can be extended over nonintegers S1 and S2. The
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium follows in
view of Theorem 1.2 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991),
as we can prove that the extended profit Ji4S11 S25 is
continuous and concave in Si.
3. Performance of Optimal
Transshipment Policies
3.1. Retailers’ Benefits from Transshipments
To quantify retailer benefits, we compare the expected
retailer profits when there is no sharing of inven-
tories to those when there is optimal sharing via
transshipments. Numerical experiments are run with
instances P0–P22 in Table 1. These instances all have
c1 = c2 = c and r1 = r2 = r . In each setting, p2 =
00151 s2 = 21 2 = 0021 t2 = 7 and only one of the param-
eters in 4p11 s11 c1 r1 1 11 t15 = 400151215111111002175
is altered at a time to see the effect of the altered
parameter. P0 denotes the base problem setting with
no alteration.
The percent increase in the expected profit of
retailer i is denoted by ãJi. Formally,
ãJi =
Ji4S
e
14t11 t251 S
e
24t11 t255− JNSi 4SNS1 1 SNS2 5
JNSi 4S
NS
1 1 S
NS
2 5
· 1000
Above, JNSi and S
NS
i , respectively, are the expected
profit and equilibrium order quantity of retailer i
with no sharing. The percent change in the total
order quantities of retailers with optimal sharing is
denoted by ãS. The percent change in retailers’ total
safety stocks is denoted by ãSS, where safety stock
of retailer i with ordering level Si is calculated as Si −
Npi. A positive (negative) change indicates an increase
(decrease) in stock amounts. In some problems, there
are multiple equilibria, but all have the same total
order quantity. In these problems, the average values
of ãJ1 and ãJ2 are reported.
When p1 increases in Table 1, ãJ1 becomes smaller
as retailer 1 focuses on sales in her own larger
market with higher holdback levels by Theorem 3.
On the other hand, retailer 2 can access customers in
larger retailer 1’s market via transshipments sent to
retailer 1. However, retailer 2 can lose access to inven-
tory at retailer 1 who increases her holdback levels.
The effect of access to the larger retailer 1’s market
Table 1 Optimal Sharing vs. No Sharing for N = 60
Changing parameter (Se11 S
e
2) ãJ1 ãJ2 ãS ãSS
P0 (10, 10) 4010 4010 0 0
p1 = 0010 P1 (7, 10) 5048 3056 0 0
p1 = 0025 P2 (16, 10) 2081 5079 −3070 −3303
p1 = 0035 P3 (23, 10) 2013 5041 0 0
s1 = 1 P4 (9, 11) 4016 5033 0 0
s1 = 3 P5 (11, 10) 3013 3096 0 0
s1 = 4 P6 (12, 10) 2012 3096 0 0
c = 3 P7 (12, 12) 1057 1057 0 0
c = 7 P8 (9, 9) 6067 6067 0 0
c = 9 P9 (7, 8)a 7087a 7087a 7014 −25
r = 8 P10 (9, 10)a 4073a 4073a 5056 b
r = 9 P11 (10, 10) 4098 4098 0 0
r = 13 P12 (10, 11)a 3077a 3077a −4055 −25
 = 2 P13 (10, 10) 3037 3037 0 0
 = 3 P14 (10, 10) 2067 2067 0 0
 = 4 P15 (10, 11)a 1022a 1022a 5000 50
1 = 0 P16 (10, 10) 5077 4040 0 0
1 = 003 P17 (10, 10) 3040 3089 0 0
1 = 005 P18 (10, 10) 2032 3021 0 0
t1 = 4 P19 (10, 10) 2027 4038 0 0
t1 = 5 P20 (10, 10) 2078 4071 0 0
t1 = 9 P21 (10, 10) 5068 2075 0 0
t1 = 10 P22 (10, 11) 4090 1091 5 50
a Indicates multiple equilibria.
bãSS in P10 is undefined because the total safety stock is zero with no
sharing.
on ãJ2 mostly dominates the effect of losing access to
retailer 1’s inventory, so ãJ2 generally increases in p1
in Table 1. Similarly, when market size N4p1 + p25 is
constant, the benefit of transshipment is higher for the
smaller retailer; see Figure 1. Because smaller retailers
can expect relatively more benefits from transship-
ments, larger retailers should demand higher trans-
shipment prices and/or be more reluctant to share
inventory.
As the salvage value si increases or the purchase
cost c decreases, the cost of leftover inventory drops
Figure 1 Effect of Relative Demand Probabilities on the Improvement
in Expected Retailer Profits for r = 10, t1 = t2 = 6, c = 4,
 = 1, 1 = 2 = 001, s1 ∈ 81129, and s2 = 2
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and retailers can stock more. Therefore, the trans-
shipment option is not executed frequently by retail-
ers. Besides, with increasing si, retailer i’s inventory
becomes more valuable to her according to Theo-
rem 3. Both cases lead to drops in ãJ1 and ãJ2 in
Table 1. The same outcome occurs when competi-
tion is intensified with a higher value of i or when
the profit margin r − ti −  per transshipped unit
is decreased with a higher value of  . The effects
of sale price r and transshipment price t1 on ãJ1
and ãJ2 are not monotone. As r increases, retailers
stock more and increase their holdback levels. There-
fore, we cannot clearly say whether more or fewer
transshipments happen with higher r . Increasing t1
decreases holdback levels at retailer 1 and can lead
to more transshipments. However, it decreases the
profit margin per transshipped unit for the requesting
retailer 2, which can lead him to order more from the
manufacturer.
The total orders with optimal sharing can be
greater (ãS > 0) or less (ãS < 0) than the total equi-
librium orders with no sharing. While a decrease
in orders may be expected as transshipment is a
type of inventory pooling, Yang and Schrage (2009)
show that inventory pooling can lead to a rise in
inventory levels. Dong and Rudi (2004) show, for a
single-period centralized system, that this inventory
anomaly can be observed when the purchasing cost
is high with respect to sales price. In Table 1, P9, P10,
P15, and P22 demonstrate the inventory anomaly in
our context.
To further substantiate the conclusions drawn from
Table 1, 3,000 randomly generated problem instances
are solved. Each parameter in these instances is sam-
pled from a uniform distribution over the follow-
ing ranges: p11 p2 ∈ 4001100255, s1, s2 ∈ 40125, c ∈ 43155,
t1 = t2 ∈ 46185, r ∈ 4101145,  ∈ 41125, and 1 = 2 ∈
400110035. In these problems, the average increase in
a retailer’s expected profit with optimal sharing over
no sharing is 3.3%. Although inventory sharing does
not always decrease the total orders and safety stocks,
it does on average by 1.27% and 5.3%, respectively.
3.2. Manufacturers’ Benefits from Transshipments
Intuitively, manufacturers would like retailers to
transship as it would increase sales to consumers.
However, extensive transshipments may decrease
manufacturer sales to retailers. So both total manu-
facturer sales, which determines the short-term man-
ufacturer profit (Dong and Rudi 2004), and total
retailer sales (Anupindi and Bassok 1999), are impor-
tant, especially if unsold products are returned to the
manufacturer or cleared with manufacturer rebates.
We combine these two measures to define the total
expected profit of the manufacturer. When “sales” is
used without a qualifier, it refers to retailer sales in
the remainder.
The expected total sales is denoted by E6TS7 and
is related to the expected total lost sales E6TL7 via
E6TS7 + E6TL7 = N4p1 + p25. Notations E6TSe7 and
E6TSNS7 denote the expected total sales when the opti-
mal sharing and no sharing policies are used, respec-
tively. The percent increase in expected total sales
from inventory sharing is ãE6TS7= 4E6TSe7/E6TSNS7−
15 ·100. The expected profit of the manufacturer is ç=
4S1 + S254c − c′5 − 4S1 + S2 − E6TS75s, where S1 + S2 is
the total manufacturer sales, c′ is the per unit produc-
tion cost of the manufacturer, and the salvage price
s is the manufacturer’s buyback price. The increase
in the expected profit of the manufacturer with opti-
mal transshipments compared with no sharing is cal-
culated as ãç = 4çe/çNS − 15 · 100. The expected
total lost sales E6TLe7, the improvement ãE6TS7 in the
expected total sales, and the improvement ãç in the
expected profit of the manufacturer are reported in
Table 2 for c′ = 1.
From ãE6TS7 > 0 throughout Table 2, a manufac-
turer enjoys increased expected retailer sales from
transshipments. On the contrary, the expected profit
of the manufacturer is not necessarily higher under
Table 2 Benefit of the Retailers’ Optimal Transshipment
Policy for the Manufacturer
E6TLe7 ãE6TS7 ãç
P0 00689 2092 1033
Increasing p1
P1 00622 3002 1036
P2 00771 1030 −1041
P3 00514 2022 1004
Increasing s1
P4 00690 2092 0064
P5 00447 2075 1095
P6 00279 2072 2072
Increasing c
P7 00081 1055 1055
P8 10491 2097 0092
P9 30475 7064 7026
Increasing r
P10 00985 6013 5082
P11 00664 3007 1040
P12 00458 1020 −2001
Increasing 
P13 00690 2092 1033
P14 00690 2092 1033
P15 00437 4042 4074
Increasing 1
P16 00680 3053 1061
P17 00697 2062 1020
P18 00720 2002 0093
Increasing t1
P19 00785 2035 1007
P20 00735 2065 1021
P21 00672 3002 1038
P22 00425 4049 4077
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optimal transshipments; see ãç for P2 and P12. This
profit is bound to be higher when the inventory
anomaly occurs, in which case both manufacturer
and retailer sales increase. ãE6TS7 and ãç are higher
when sale price r and overflow probability 1 are
lower and when purchase cost c, transshipment price
t1, transportation cost  , and salvage price s1 are
higher.
Instead of offering costly incentives to the requested
retailer (Zhao et al. 2005) to induce more inven-
tory sharing, a manufacturer, in view of Table 1 and
Theorem 3, can encourage retailers to set transship-
ment prices as high as possible. As transshipment
price increases, more requests are accepted and sales
increase. Besides, the requesting retailer, who wants
to avoid stockouts, may buy more inventory from the
manufacturer. This is why the manufacturer should
prefer high transshipment prices rather than incen-
tives. Shao et al. (2011) reach a similar conclusion in
a single-period setting.
The effect of the overflow probability i on sales
is emphasized by Anupindi and Bassok (1999). They
conclude that the expected total sales in a no shar-
ing system is higher than sales in a complete sharing
system for values of i greater than a threshold level.
From our numerical studies, this conclusion does not
extend to the comparison of optimal sharing with no
sharing. In particular, ãE6TS7 is always nonnegative
in Table 2.
The 3,000 instances, introduced above for quantify-
ing retailers’ benefit, are now reconsidered. On aver-
age, the optimal sharing policy increases sales by
2.14%, which corresponds to a 49.53% decrease in total
lost sales. Total sales decreased in only 8 instances
out of 3,000. On the other hand, manufacturer sales
decreased under the optimal sharing system in almost
one third of the instances. Because sales are more
Table 3 Multiretailer Heuristic Pseudocode
Initialize: Set i04x5= s  x. Compute pairwise-holdback levels x˜ ijn and no-sharing order quantities S.
M= 811 0 0 0 1M9 and M−i = 811 0 0 0 1M9\8i9. /∗ in is profit under heuristic; analogous to  in ∗/
Iterate:
For n = 11 0 0 0 1 N , For m = 11 0 0 0 1M, For xm = 01 0 0 0 1 Sm ,
For i = 11 0 0 0 1M, /∗ Retailer i is visited by a customer and then W li is profit of retailer l ∗/
If xi ≥ 1, W ii 2= ri + in−14x − ei 5 and W li 2= ln−14x − ei 5, l ∈M−i ;
else /∗ Retailer i requests from retailer j∗/
j 2= arg maxl∈M8xl/pl9.
If xj ≥ 1 and xj > x˜ j in , W ii 2= ri − j i − tj + in−14x − ej 5 and W li 2=l=j tj + ln−14x − ej 51 l ∈M−i
else /∗ Retailer j rejects request of i whose customer overflows to k ∗/
W li 2=
∑M
k=11 k 6=i ik8xk≥14l=k rk + ln−14x − ek 55+xk=0ln−14x59+ 41 −
∑M
k=11 k 6=i ik 5
l
n−14x51 l ∈M0
If xj = 0, W li 2= ln−14x51 l ∈M. /∗ No inventory is left in system ∗/
EndFor i.
ln4x5 2= 41 −
∑M
i=1 pi 5
l
n−14x5+
∑M
i=1 piW
l
i 1 l ∈M0
EndFor xm . EndFor m. EndFor n.
Output: JHi 4S5= iN 4S5− ciSi .
important in the long run, a manufacturer engaged in
a long-term relationship with retailers benefits more
from transshipments.
4. Multiretailer System
In a system with M (>2) retailers, a transshipment pol-
icy based on holdback levels that are a function of only
time and the inventory level at the requested retailer is
no longer optimal, which is illustrated by an example
in the e-companion appendix. A policy that is based
on inventory levels at all retailers is hard to compute
and implement. So we address the multiretailer prob-
lem with a heuristic. Huang and Sošic´ (2010) note the
difficulty of analyzing transshipments among many
retailers and introduce several heuristics.
A heuristic needs to make two important deci-
sions. First, the requesting retailer must decide which
retailer to request a transshipment from. A requested
retailer with more inventory and less expected
demand is more likely to accept a request. So in our
multiretailer heuristic, the requesting retailer requests
from the retailer whose index j maximizes xj/pj over
1 ≤ j ≤M . The second decision is the acceptance or
rejection of a request. Our heuristic is based on
the pairwise-optimal holdback levels for two retail-
ers from §2. For requested retailer j and requesting
retailer i, the holdback level is denoted by x˜j1 in . In the
heuristic, requested retailer j accepts the request of
retailer i if xj > x˜
j1 i
n . When requested retailer j rejects
the request, the customer of requesting retailer i over-
flows only once with probability ik to retailer k. This
and the two decisions discussed above specify our
multiretailer heuristic detailed in Table 3. For brevity,
let c, s, x, and S be cost, salvage value, inventory
level, and order quantity vectors, respectively. Let ei
be the ith unit vector and ji be the transportation cost
from retailer j to retailer i. Let A = 1 if statement A
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is correct; otherwise, it is zero. Let “” denote scalar
multiplication of two vectors.
To assess the performance of the heuristic, the sum
of retailer profits
∑M
m=i J
H
i 4S5 is compared with the
optimal profit of the centralized system J 4S5, which
can be computed directly without characterizing the
optimal transshipment policy from J 4S5=N 4S5−c S,
where 04x5= s  x and
n4x5 =
(
1 −
M∑
i=1
pi
)
n−14x5
+
M∑
i=1
pi
{
xi≥14ri +n−14x− ei55
+ xi=0 max8TPi1OPi9
}
1
TPi = ri + max
1≤j≤M1xj≥1
8n−14x− ej5− ji91
OPi =
M∑
k=11k 6=i
ik6xk≥14rk+n−14x−ek55+xk=0n−14x57
+
(
1 −
M∑
k=11 k 6=i
ik
)
n−14x51
where TPi is the profit with a transshipment from
retailer j , and OPi is the profit with a customer
either overflowing to retailer k or out of the system.
Figure 2 (a) Average Heuristic Gap vs. M; (b) Gap vs. ti for ri = 11 and si = 2; (c) Gap vs. ri for ti = 7 and si = 2; (d) Gap vs. si for ri = 11 and ti = 7
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2(a) (b)
(c) (d)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A
ve
ra
ge
 h
eu
ris
tic
 g
ap
 (
%
)
Number of retailers in the system
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0
H
eu
ris
tic
 g
ap
 (
%
)
Transshipment price
M=10
M=4
M=7
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.5 11.0 11.5 12.0 12.5
H
eu
ris
tic
 g
ap
 (
%
)
Sale price per unit
M=10M=4
M=7
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7
H
eu
ris
tic
 g
ap
 (
%
)
Salvage price per unit
M=10
M=4
M=7
0
Both profits are for a customer arrival to stocked-out
retailer i. Because inventory and transshipment deci-
sions of the decentralized system are feasible in the
centralized system, J 4S5 is an upper bound for the
total profits of a decentralized system under any pol-
icy. In particular,
∑M
i=1 J
H
i 4S5≤ J 4S5.
The heuristic gap 41 −∑Mi=1 JHi 4S5/J 4S55 · 100 is com-
puted with N = 50 and M ∈ 831 0 0 0 1109. For every
M , 50 instances are generated by setting ci = cˆ, ti =
tˆ, ri = rˆ , ij = ˆ , and ij = ˆ for 1 ≤ i1 j ≤ M , where
cˆ1 tˆ1 rˆ1 ˆ1 and ˆ are sampled along with pi and si from
a uniform distribution over the following ranges: pi ∈
4011/M5, si ∈ 40125, cˆ ∈ 43155, tˆ ∈ 46185, rˆ ∈ 4101145, ˆ ∈
41125, and ˆ ∈ 4011/4M−155. In each instance, retailers
can have different demand probabilities and differ-
ent salvage values while each of the other parameters
is the same across retailers. With pi uniformly dis-
tributed over 4011/M5, total expected system demand
per period is 1/2. Because the total demand does not
change with M , the heuristic gaps can be compared
across different values of M . To focus on transship-
ment decisions, optimal orders under no sharing are
used in the heuristic and centralized solutions. Note
that orders differ slightly from no sharing to opti-
mal sharing; see the ãS column in Table 1. The aver-
age heuristic gap over 50 instances is illustrated in
Figure 2(a) for M ∈ 831 0 0 0 1109. Because the average is
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less than 1% in all but the M = 10 retailer case, our
multiretailer heuristic appears to perform well.
Another issue to investigate is how the heuris-
tic gap changes with monetary parameters such as
market price, transshipment price, and salvage value.
The only other monetary parameter is purchase cost,
which can always be set equal to one by scaling
monetary units. In Figures 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d), M
varies over 84171109 and the identical retailers have
ci = 5, pi = 007/M , ij = 1, and ij = 0063/4M − 15 for
i1 j ∈ 811 0 0 0 1M9. In Figures 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d), one of
r , t, and s varies while the other two parameters are
fixed as in the figure caption.
Figure 2(b) shows that the heuristic gap reduces
with transshipment prices, which also reduce hold-
back levels by Theorem 3. Thus, retailers guard less of
their inventory and share more with others as trans-
shipment prices increase. This cooperative tendency
brings the heuristic solution closer to the centralized
solution. Increasing r or s has two effects, i.e., higher
ordering quantities and higher holdback levels. The
first effect increases the cooperative tendency, while
the second decreases it. The direction of the combined
effect is not clear while its magnitude is small from
Figures 2(c) and 2(d), where the y-axes have ranges
of 6010047 and 60100127. Hence, the market price or the
salvage value has little effect on the heuristic gap.
5. Concluding Remarks
Many independent retailers do not want to commit
to extreme transshipment policies such as complete
sharing or no sharing and prefer flexibility in deciding
whether to accept a transshipment request. We pro-
vide this flexibility by delegating the acceptance deci-
sion to the requested retailer who bases that decision
on the current time and inventory levels. A realis-
tic model is formulated in both cost/revenue struc-
ture and sequence of events. For example, retailers
decide on orders before the sales season. In-season
transshipment requests happen when demands occur
at a stocked-out retailer. The optimal transshipment
policy has built-in flexibility that allows the retailer
to reject a request one day, but accept another request
a few days later. Finally, our optimal transshipment
policy for two-retailer systems is used to develop an
effective heuristic for many-retailer systems.
An important ingredient of our transshipment
model is the customer overflow probability, which
is higher for retailers that are geographically close
to each other, and explains competition between
close retailers. Some manufacturers have retailers
with large customer overflow probabilities. Their
sales increase, marginally, when retailers shift to com-
plete inventory sharing from no sharing. On the
other hand, many manufacturers whose retailers have
a small customer overflow probability expect an
increase in total sales with complete inventory shar-
ing. Yet they find it difficult to convince independent
retailers to completely share their inventory. These
manufacturers can suggest our optimal sharing pol-
icy to their retailers who should be more sympathetic
to optimal sharing because of its flexibility, which is
absent both in complete and no sharing.
Implementing a model in practice depends on the
ease of computations and data availability in addition
to sharpness of the managerial insights. Our model
requires the computation of optimal holdback levels,
which depend only on retailers’ costs and demand
parameters, and can be easily computed using spread-
sheets. Once the holdback levels and, accordingly,
profits for each pair of order quantities are com-
puted, the equilibria for the ordering game can be
found. If an inventory manager does not believe or
understand the rationality assumptions of game the-
ory, he or she can still implement the optimal hold-
back levels with any order quantities, as these levels
do not depend on the order quantities or demands
that have been realized. The robustness of the trans-
shipment policy against order quantities further facili-
tates implementation in practice when retailers do not
receive their exact orders because of capacity/yield
problems or inventory loss/shrinkage.
Electronic Companion
An electronic companion to this paper is available as part of
the online version that can be found at http://msom.journal
.informs.org/.
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